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I
n February 2017, the Arizona state legislature 
passed a statute that was celebrated by the block-
chain community as a sign that regulators were 
finally getting it.1 The statute allows signatures 
“secured through a blockchain” to be treated as 
“electronic signatures”2 and enables the use of 
blockchain-powered smart contracts in commerce.3 
Crucially, the statute defines “blockchain technol-
ogy” as “distributed ledger technology that uses a 
distributed, decentralized, shared and replicated 
ledger, which may be public or private, permis-
sioned or permissionless, or driven by tokenized 
crypto economics or tokenless.” It further provides 
that “[t]he data on the ledger is protected with cryp-
tography, is immutable and auditable and provides an 
uncensored truth.”4 
What a mess. Instead of celebrating, we should 
be lamenting this legislation as woefully uninformed 
and creating more problems than it solves. Focusing 
merely on the statute’s definition of “blockchain 
technology,” numerous problems become evident. 
First, rather than being an inherent characteristic, 
“immutability” of blockchain records is a matter of 
debate,5 as high-profile events in the blockchain 
space have shown that blockchain records are 
changeable at will by the people who comprise 
the blockchain system,6 and it currently is unclear 
which variations of blockchain technology actually 
create a record that even approaches immutability.7 
Simply stating in a statute that “data on the 
ledger is … immutable” does not actually make data 
immutable. This raises complicated questions. Do 
the legislators intend for data on a blockchain to 
be treated as if it is immutable, even if real-world 
events already have shown that it is not? (Think 
Continued on page 10
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back to the July 2016 Ethereum hard fork when the 
blockchain record was rewritten to recover funds 
stolen from the hacked DAO.)8 Or are they using 
the word “immutable” to mean something other than 
its normal meaning of “unchangeable,” but just not 
being explicit about it? What if public and private 
blockchains actually differ in their ability to create 
“immutable” records (which is one position in the 
technology debate),9 but the statute states that both 
types do? 
Second, the statute states that “the data on the 
ledger … provides an uncensored truth.”10 Again, 
this is a vast overstatement of the technology’s 
capabilities, as the truth of any data appearing on a 
blockchain ledger (other than perhaps the transfer 
of the native token itself) is limited by the quality or 
truth of the data entered on the ledger. If a false piece 
of data is put on a blockchain ledger, it remains false, 
regardless of the fact that it appears on the ledger 
(the garbage in/garbage out idea). The “uncensored 
truth” language in the statute echoes the lingo of the 
cypherpunk and crypto-anarchist groups that Bitcoin 
emerged from, and is bizarrely political and out-of-
place in a statute. The language raises similar issues 
to the use of “immutable” in the statute, as it suggests 
that data on a blockchain ledger is true even if it isn’t. 
Does that mean we should treat demonstrably false 
data as true, just because it appears in a blockchain 
record? How would that make sense?
Even this cursory analysis of the Arizona statute’s 
definition of blockchain technology demonstrates 
that big problems can be created by legislating with-
out an understanding of the relevant subject matter. 
Worryingly, the issues with the Arizona statute reflect 
a poor comprehension of blockchain technology and 
a failure to critically analyze the subject by the legisla-
ture and the governor who signed the statute into law. 
With regulators and policy makers around the world 
grappling with how to handle the much-hyped tech-
nology, the Arizona statute provides just one example 
of how things can go wrong, particularly when regu-
lators do not carefully scrutinize the technological 
jargon they use. With numerous influential people 
touting blockchain technology as revolutionary for 
countless important social systems, from voting, to 
property records, to finance, it is critical for regulators 
and policy makers to get it right, even more so as 
government policy makers consider implementing 
the technology in their own consequential systems. 
With Arizona’s problematic statute as backdrop, 
this essay focuses on the fast-moving, contested, 
and often confusing language around blockchain 
technology, and the challenges this terminology 
muddle raises for regulators. After illuminating the 
language problems and their significance, I suggest 
ways that regulators can overcome the confusion 
and misunderstanding so easily generated by block-
chain technology’s unsettled vocabulary. In order for 
regulators, policy makers, and potential adopters to 
make the best decisions about blockchain technol-
ogy, they must understand its actual characteristics, 
capabilities, and risks. Penetrating the language barri-
ers around blockchain technology is essential to gain-
ing this understanding, and therefore to responsibly 
and effectively use the technology. Moreover, actions 
such as those of the Arizona legislature demonstrate 
that there is no time to waste in the education process.
THE BLOCKCHAIN 
VOCABULARY VORTEX
As blockchain technology has gained attention 
from the financial sector and others, its vocabulary 
has rapidly grown and changed. Copious jargon is 
used in the field, often imprecisely. Many differ-
ent terms are somewhat overlapping, increasing the 
confusion. For example, “blockchain technology” 
also is referred to as “distributed ledger technology” 
or “DLT” or “shared ledger technology” or “SLT” or 
a “distributed database.” There is an emerging sense 
that blockchain technology is a subcategory of DLT, 
but that is not yet resolved. Other examples of ter-
minology problems include inconsistency in referring 
to the record generated by blockchain technology as 
“tamper-proof” versus “tamper-evident” or “tamper-
resistant.” Each of these presumably means something 
very different about the reliability or robustness of 
the blockchain record, yet the terms often seem to 
be used indiscriminately. Numerous other examples 
of contested terms abound (e.g., immutable, trustless, 
decentralized), as I explore more deeply in a lengthier 
forthcoming article,11 and awareness of the terminol-
ogy problems within the blockchain ecosystem is 
growing, as evidenced by numerous articles seeking 
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to provide definitions of contested terms,12 and efforts 
by international organizations to begin to standardize 
the terminology.13
Language in general is always on the move, but 
is particularly fluid around a fast-moving innovation 
such as blockchain technology. As the technology 
is tweaked, new terms are created to distinguish the 
new version from the old, as has occurred with the 
creation of the terms “permissionless” and “permis-
sioned” blockchains to distinguish the original open 
blockchains such as Bitcoin from new ones that have 
a limited and known set of transaction processors in 
the network. Further, new terms are introduced as the 
original ones are rethought, perhaps as understanding 
of the technology’s capabilities shifts. For example, 
a blockchain record generally has been described as 
“tamper-proof,” an extremely bold claim suggesting it 
is impossible to alter; it is becoming more common, 
however, to see it described as “tamper-evident” or 
“tamper-resistant,” which are more modest claims 
about the record’s strength. 
Blockchain technology’s terminology also has 
shifted for marketing, or commercial purposes. For 
instance, when Bitcoin became associated with the 
criminal underworld of money laundering and the 
illegal goods marketplace Silk Road, people began 
talking about the potential offered by “blockchain 
technology” rather than Bitcoin itself, and a number 
of companies with “Bit” in their names changed them 
to escape the Bitcoin taint.14 Finally, the interdis-
ciplinary nature of blockchain technology has con-
tributed to vocabulary problems, as numerous fields 
(e.g., cryptography, computer science, economics, 
etc.) have brought their own jargon to the discussion, 
making communication more confused.
REGULATORY CHALLENGES
Despite nascent standardization efforts, the dif-
ficulties with language remain, and are highly prob-
lematic for regulators and others seeking to learn 
about blockchain technology. Language barriers make 
it difficult for regulators to pin down the facts about 
the technology and to distinguish between different 
variations of the technology. Further, the confused 
language around the technology increases the poten-
tial for regulatory capture, as well as the potential for 
inconsistent regulation across jurisdictions. All of 
these challenges make it more likely for regulators to 
make flawed decisions about the technology, under-
mining their effectiveness in protecting consumers 
and in maintaining financial and social stability. 
Below, I discuss each of these challenges in turn.
First, the inconsistent, confusing, and sometimes 
misleading vocabulary around blockchain technology 
can make it difficult for regulators to get a handle 
on the “facts” about the technology.15 For example, 
how robust is the record created by the technology? 
Is it impossible to change or tamper with, or just really 
hard but possible? Is the need to trust other people in 
a blockchain network actually eliminated through the 
use of the technology (making it “trustless”), or is 
trust just displaced to other parties? Does the use of 
blockchain technology to create a record make the 
data on the record more likely to be true, or does 
the reliability of the record ultimately depend on 
the quality of the data entered? Arriving at accurate 
answers to these questions is critical in understanding 
the technology’s true capabilities and risk profile. It 
should go without saying that the better the regulator 
understands the subject matter, the better decisions 
he or she can make, whether in deciding the details 
and scope of regulation, or in deciding not to regulate 
at all.
Second, the muddled language around block-
chain technology makes it difficult to distinguish 
between variations of the technology, complicating 
regulators’ risk assessment process. Multiple varia-
tions of blockchain technology now exist, with each 
having different capabilities and risks. It is common, 
however, for all variations to be referred to as “block-
chain technology,” and to describe the entire diverse 
mix as having the same fundamental characteristics of 
immutability, security, and trustlessness. This makes 
it hard for regulators to grasp the true risk profile of 
a given form of blockchain technology, which means 
that their decisions related to the technology may be 
ill-informed. For example, should blockchains that 
use different consensus mechanisms to agree on the 
state of the blockchain record be treated the same 
or differently from a regulatory perspective? What 
about public versus private blockchains? A confused 
terminology makes these types of question more dif-
ficult to answer.
Third, the language haze can contribute to other 
problems for regulators, including increasing the 
chance of regulatory capture and all of the negative 
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effects that brings. “[R]egulatory capture occurs when 
bureaucrats, regulators and politicians cease to serve 
some notion of a wider collective public interest and 
begin to systematically favor specific vested inter-
ests, usually the very interests they were supposed to 
regulate and restrain for the wider public interest.”16 
Regulatory capture is made more likely for block-
chain technology because the confused vocabulary 
can increase regulators’ dependence on blockchain 
industry experts to explain the technology to them. 
Of course, consulting with industry experts is essen-
tial to understand the facts well enough to make good 
regulatory decisions.
However, with blockchain technology, the ter-
minology problems can make it easier for proponents 
of the technology to overstate the capabilities and 
benefits of the technology, while understating the risks 
and potential downsides. This is compounded by the 
complex, interdisciplinary nature of blockchain tech-
nology, which may make regulators less likely to inter-
rogate industry’s claims about the technology, as they 
may feel out of their depth. Worryingly, blockchain 
technology’s opaque complexity mirrors that of the 
complicated financial products and risk models that 
contributed to the Financial Crisis. As regulators were 
“daunted by the complexity posed by the new financial 
instruments and awed by the promise of new financial 
engineering to shift and spread risk efficiently,”17 they 
failed to understand the true risk profile of these finan-
cial creations. There is potential for similar deference 
by regulators towards blockchain technology.
Moreover, the potential for regulatory capture is 
further increased with blockchain technology because 
of the high number of prominent former regulators 
and well-respected businesspeople who are working 
for blockchain technology companies or serving as 
advisors or board members to them.18 This means that 
regulators may have personal relationships with the 
people who are explaining the technology to them, 
or may be influenced by the reputation or prestige of 
the person associated with the technology. The strong 
possibility for “cognitive capture” or “cultural capture” 
of regulators by the blockchain technology industry 
increases the likelihood that misunderstandings about 
the technology (willfully or innocently introduced) 
will shape regulatory and policy decisions about it.19
Fourth, the unclear vocabulary around block-
chain technology could lead to inconsistent regu-
lation across jurisdictions. Striking differences in 
regulation could emerge across jurisdictions due to 
differing understandings of the capabilities and risks 
of the technology, even if regulators have aligning 
policy objectives. For instance, if one jurisdiction 
(such as Arizona) understands that a record created 
through blockchain technology (of whatever varia-
tion) is “immutable” and inevitably reflects “truth,” 
then that jurisdiction may choose to give a block-
chain record privileged status for evidentiary pur-
poses. A jurisdiction that understands a blockchain 
record to be difficult but not impossible to alter, and 
the “truth” of the information stored on the record to 
be limited by the quality or truth of the information 
put into the record, may treat blockchain records 
the same as any other record under evidentiary rules. 
Both jurisdictions may have the same policy goal of 
structuring their rules of evidence to permit reliable 
information to be introduced in a case, but could wind 
up with wildly divergent treatment of the records, and 
potentially differing outcomes for a single set of facts. 
Analogous inconsistencies in regulation could 
arise in other regulatory domains, including in setting 
reporting or disclosure obligations, standards for fraud, 
or multiple other possibilities. Inconsistent regulation 
can lead to forum shopping and regulatory arbitrage, 
as parties search for the most attractive legal regime. 
Further, diverging regulation can increase compliance 
costs for parties operating across multiple jurisdic-
tions, as is likely for blockchain technology with its 
effortless spanning of borders.
As this brief discussion makes clear, the vocabu-
lary problems around blockchain technology can 
generate serious consequences, making it crucial for 
regulators and others seeking to understand the tech-
nology to be acutely alert to the presence of language 
issues, and to utilize the critical approach to the tech-
nology that I recommend below.
PENETRATING THE LANGUAGE 
BARRIER
What can regulators and others seeking to under-
stand blockchain technology do to fight through the 
language barrier surrounding it? Simply being aware 
that blockchain vocabulary is treacherous can help, 
as can a critical approach to the learning process. 
Presumably this is the approach everyone already 
takes when learning about a new topic, but sometimes 
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a reminder of these basic principles is worthwhile. 
As the Financial Crisis made clear, we often either 
assume we understand something well, or pretend to 
understand something well, when the reality is that 
we have failed to perceive critical facts and implica-
tions of a given subject. In this section, therefore, I 
highlight the mindset and learning strategies that can 
help regulators and others achieve a more accurate 
and nuanced understanding of blockchain technol-
ogy’s risks and benefits.
INTERROGATE HYPE
Hype about blockchain technology is rampant, 
with many making grand claims about its ability to 
solve vexing human problems such as financial inclu-
sion, corrupt governments, delays to settlement of 
transactions, and many more. Unfortunately, block-
chain’s language problems can make it more difficult 
to distinguish hype from reality. For instance, it is 
common to see references to “the blockchain” or just 
“blockchain” when people describe the benefits of 
the technology, which is problematic given the vast 
differences in features among different forms of the 
technology. Grouping all variations of the technology 
under the label “blockchain” can lead to major mis-
understandings about each variant’s risks and capa-
bilities, and regulators must be alert to this potential 
as they work to grasp the truth about the technology.
BE SKEPTICAL OF EVERYONE 
AND EVERY FORUM
“Fake news” is everywhere in the blockchain 
technology space, and can even show up in reputable 
sources, often cloaked in terminology problems. For 
example, a number of sources in reputable fora have 
stated that Estonia used blockchain technology in its 
national digital identity system,20 but Estonian officials 
and historic records indicate this is untrue.21 Further, 
I and others have questioned the appropriateness of 
the term “immutable” to describe a record created by 
blockchain technology;22 the term is omnipresent in 
blockchain discourse, including in reports and articles 
in prestigious publications, making misunderstand-
ing about the technology’s capabilities likely.23 These 
types of inaccurate or misleading statements, whose 
inaccuracy can be masked by problematic vocabulary, 
can become embedded in the discourse, as an inaccu-
racy is cited as true again and again. 
This means that one cannot assume that a given 
forum, whether publication or venue, will provide 
accurate information about blockchain technology. 
Misleading or inaccurate statements and language 
about the technology appear in sources that are 
treated as authoritative and reliable by default, often 
because of the source’s history or an association with 
a prestigious and trusted institution.24 So, skepticism 
about claims made regarding blockchain technology 
is warranted, regardless of the legitimacy or prestige 
of the forum where the claim is made. Regulators 
must recognize that traditional markers of legitimacy 
are insufficient to assume reliable information about 
blockchain technology, and should therefore thor-
oughly probe every claim.
IDENTIFY AND WEIGH CONFLICTS 
OF INTEREST
As with any new industry, there is a lot of money 
up for grabs in the blockchain technology space, and 
regulators must keep in mind that people’s financial 
incentives can influence their view of the technol-
ogy, its potential, and its risks. Much of the education 
of regulators and policy makers is being performed 
by blockchain industry lobbying organizations, such 
as the Digital Chamber of Commerce, the Global 
Blockchain Business Council, and the industry-
funded think tank and advocacy organization Coin 
Center. This does not mean that the information pro-
vided by such organizations necessarily is misleading 
or wrong, but regulators must be alert to how industry 
incentives can impact their input, and weigh how 
these conflicts affect the reliability of the information 
and recommendations of these groups.
“Everybody’s got an angle”25 in the blockchain 
space, from industry players to the numerous and vocal 
thought leaders, and regulators must sniff out each 
party’s angle and weight its perspective accordingly.
SEEK DIVERSE POINTS OF VIEW
In the last few years, a consensus has rapidly 
formed that blockchain technology is a revolutionary 
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innovation that will transform a wide swath of indus-
tries and practices. As the consensus has spread, few 
dissenting opinions have been expressed. This quick 
agreement means it is likely that there are many criti-
cal questions about the technology, its capabilities, 
and its risks that have not been answered or even 
asked.
Regulators should therefore seek out diverse 
perspectives in learning about blockchain technology 
to help them to avoid misunderstandings and group 
think. This means that they should solicit input from 
critics of the technology as well as proponents; from 
those who see the benefits and risks of blockchain 
technology as great as well as those who see them as 
small or somewhere in the middle. They should seek 
advice from people from different academic disci-
plines and business areas, given the extreme interdis-
ciplinarity of blockchain technology. Similarly, other 
forms of diversity, including gender, race, economic, 
and geographic diversity, can help regulators gain a 
more nuanced, complete understanding of the tech-
nology. The benefits of a diverse group of decision-
makers are well known,26 and regulators must ensure 
that their learnings are as fulsome as possible.
DON’T SKIP ANALYTICAL STEPS (DON’T 
ASSUME FOUNDATIONS ARE SOLID)
As mentioned previously, one reason the vocabu-
lary around blockchain technology is so unsettled is 
that the technology is evolving so rapidly. Nothing is 
settled about blockchain technology, including what 
it is, its features, or its flaws. These are the subject 
of much experimentation and debate amongst tech-
nologists and entrepreneurs in the space. Yet policy 
makers and regulators often jump ahead to questions 
of the implications of the technology—how can we 
use it to solve problems, or prevent it from being 
used improperly—and assume that foundational facts 
about the technology are settled.
Because both the technology and its vocabulary 
are so fluid and immature, regulators must ask ques-
tions about everything. Does the technology actually 
create immutable records in a secure or trustless 
way? How, precisely, does it do this? How does each 
variation to the technology, whether in the consensus 
mechanism, the permitted validators, or the cryptog-
raphy selected, alter the capabilities and risks of the 
technology? What assumptions are technologists and 
businesses making that are left unsaid? What does 
every word of jargon mean to the person who uses it? 
Any less-thorough inquiry is inadequate, given 
the combination of language issues, complexity, and 
hype that surround this fast-moving technology.
DON’T BE A LEMMING
Regulators and policy makers face significant 
pressures to act in particular ways. They often are 
caught in the uncomfortable position of being blamed 
for not being innovative enough and killing jobs with 
inappropriate regulation, while at the same time, they 
are criticized if they inadequately protect consum-
ers or fail to prevent or adequately manage a crisis 
(with the Financial Crisis likely a searing memory 
for many). 
This can make it tempting to just do what other 
regulators and policy makers are doing, so that one 
can’t be individually blamed down the road for mak-
ing a bad decision. There are benefits to conformity, 
one of which is diffusion of accountability. Herd 
behavior, “the phenomenon [in which]…everyone 
does what everyone else is doing, even when their 
private information suggests doing something quite 
different,”27 can manifest among regulators28 as well as 
in the adoption of new technologies.29 No one wants 
to be seen as restricting innovation or to miss out on 
a useful new technology, so when regulators see oth-
ers contemplating introducing a central bank digital 
currency, or using blockchain technology for govern-
ment processes, they may feel compelled to join in.
Regulators and policy makers need to be willing 
to swim against the current until they have investi-
gated blockchain technology thoroughly and have 
developed their own, well-founded knowledge about 
it. Only then they can make useful regulatory choices 
(including decisions not to regulate at all) or decide 
whether adoption of the technology is appropriate.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Flawed understandings of blockchain technology 
can yield poor regulation and inappropriate adoption 
of the technology in critically important systems. It 
is crucial that regulators and policy makers actually 
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understand what they are grappling with before mak-
ing regulatory decisions (including whether to regu-
late at all). The rapidly-changing, contested, and 
often misleading vocabulary around blockchain tech-
nology makes regulators’ task that much more dif-
ficult, as the facts end up buried beneath a muddle of 
impenetrable gibberish.
Rather than throwing up their hands, regulators, 
policymakers, and those considering adopting the 
technology must take a critical, deliberative approach 
to learning about blockchain technology, with aware-
ness that language issues can obscure reality and 
lead to misunderstandings. With critically important 
social systems being vetted for the technology’s use, 
and regulators and policy makers taking actions as we 
speak, this matter is incredibly urgent, and must be 
brought immediately to the attention of blockchain 
decision-makers. I close then, dear reader, with a 
request: don’t just sit on this information—go out and 
spread the word!
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